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This paper examines possible avenues to salvage national retirement programs.
It first proposes changes to the system which would in theory entice Americans
to remain in the work force at older ages, such as adjusting the retirement
age, expanding the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings calculation base, establishing a ‘paid-up’ category for payroll taxes, establishing Medicare as the
primary payer for working seniors, and reducing or eliminating regulations
that prevent men and women from gradually retiring. The paper then turns to
look at the effect of policy changes on labor force participation. The data is
processed with an Ordinary Least Squares estimator. The results of the eight
regressions were mixed, and are discussed in detail within the paper.

Introduction
By now, it is common knowledge that demographic trends over the next twenty to thirty
years will require a major overhaul of our national retirement programs. Escalating costs
(both observed and projected) of these programs necessitate serious examination of current
policy to identify reforms which will aid sustainability. The impending retirement of the
‘baby-boom’ generation makes such study all the more timely. A growing body of literature
has emerged around the idea that retirement systems can be adjusted to encourage workers
to remain in the labor force for longer periods of time. Longer careers, it is argued, will
help to keep the system functioning under the demographic stresses imposed by a skewed
population distribution and the growing cost of medical care.
Unfortunately, as the system stands now, various policies in Social Security,
Medicare, and pension plans create significant disincentives for older workers who wish
to remain in the labor market. One Urban Institute study found that the implicit tax rate on
work rose from 14 percent at age 55 to nearly 50 percent at age 70.1 This paper will examine proposals to reduce or eliminate economic disincentives for longer careers and attempt
to model labor force participation decisions at older ages for men and women.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/pursuit
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The Proposals
Adjusting the Retirement Age
One of the most straightforward proposals is an across the board increase in both the early
and normal retirement ages for social security benefits. Currently, the Early Retirement
Age (ERA) stands at 62, while the Normal Retirement Age (NRA) stands at 67 for workers born after 1960. Some propose automatic increases based on average life expectancy,2
while others propose changes in either the NRA or ERA, but not both.
Because Social Security payments are actuarially adjusted to ensure that lifetime
benefits paid to retirees remain the same, regardless of retirement date, changes in the ERA
and NRA will have different effects on retirement incentives. Increases in the ERA will
delay the earliest age at which seniors can draw Social Security, but will have little effect
on the lifetime value of Social Security payments to any given retiree. However, an adjustment in the NRA will have no effect on the age at which seniors can begin to draw Social
Security payments, but will instead change the lifetime value of such payments.
In theory, an increase in the NRA should lead to an increase in average retirement
age. Lower lifetime benefits will necessitate that workers remain in the workforce for
longer periods of time in order to reach the same levels of consumption in retirement.
However, Burtless and Quinn argue in a 2000 paper that increases in the NRA without
accompanying increases in the ERA would lead short sighted workers to retire ‘too early’
and that the social security benefits received in retirement would be insufficient to support
these workers.3 They suggest that the ERA must keep pace with the NRA if Social Security
is to appropriately serve seniors.
This does not mean that ERA reform proposals are without objection. Many workers are unable to continue working past age 62, due either to health constraints or to the
physical demands of the workplace.4 Any increase in the retirement age will simply shift
this group of people off the rolls of Social Security at the cost of an expanded disability
program. Additionally, increases in the ERA have adverse effects on workers with shorter
than average lifespans. As African-Americans and low income workers tend to have shorter lifespans, reforms to the ERA will disproportionately harm these groups, and may be
branded by some as discriminatory.5
Regardless of the objections, changes to the ERA must be a central part of any
reform. According to a 2006 Urban Institute Discussion Paper, few retirees look to the
long-term effects of their retirement decisions, instead evaluating their options at a single
point in time.6 In other words, benefit availability is more important than benefit amounts.7
As long as Social Security payments, no matter how small, are available at age 62, workers
will begin to evaluate their retirement options at that time.
Expanding the AIME Calculation Base
Another proposal to encourage later retirement ages would expand the base used to calculate the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME).8 The AIME, which is used in the
formula for determining Social Security benefits for retirees, is currently computed by
averaging the highest 35 years of earnings for a beneficiary. Should a beneficiary work
fewer than 35 years, the calculation imputes zeros for years that they received no income.
As a result, beneficiaries face a strong disincentive to work for longer than 35 years.
In the 35th year of work, earnings are still replacing zeros in the calculation of AIME, but in
the 36th year, earnings begin to replace years of lower income. Workers increase their future
benefits at a significantly slower rate, but continue to pay payroll taxes at normal levels.
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Expanding the AIME base to calculate average earnings over forty years, as opposed to the
thirty-five year calculation under current law, delays the effect of this disincentive by five
years. In short, it rewards workers who remain in the workforce for longer periods of time
while penalizing those who leave the workforce early.
AIME base expansion proposals function similarly to the NRA increases mentioned
above. Both reforms result in a benefit decrease without an increase the early retirement
age – allowing workers to potentially retire too early to sufficiently provide for consumption in retirement. AIME reform, however, focuses on career length, while NRA reform
focuses on age. The practical consequence of these reforms is that increases in NRA represent across the board benefit cuts to all retirees, while the AIME reforms limit benefit cuts
only to retirees with shorter careers.
Establish a ‘Paid Up’ Category for Payroll Taxes
While expanding the AIME base to include 40 years does push back a significant disincentive to work by an additional 5 years, it does not eliminate the disincentive. The disincentive, however, could be weakened or eliminated with the establishment of a ‘paid-up’
category for payroll taxes. One approach would have all retirees who reach the maximum
number of AIME indexed years of work (35 under current law) exempted from the Social
Security segment of payroll taxes.9 Other approaches would have workers exempted from
Social Security contributions after reaching the NRA.10 Both function similarly – greatly
reducing current incentives to retire early.
If Social Security is truly to be considered as retirement savings and not as income redistribution from workers to retirees, it would seem that individuals should no
longer be required to pay into the system when they have hit the savings cap imposed by
the AIME. To do otherwise would impose a tax for which seniors receive no benefit – a
significant contributor to the increase in labor disincentives. A June 2006 study by the
Urban Institute found that exempting seniors past the normal retirement age from additional Social Security contributions would lower the “implicit tax rate on work at ages 66
and older” by 10 percentage points.
Ensure High Income Earners with Short Careers Face the Same Progressivity
High income workers face additional disincentives to work at older ages because of the
method with which benefits calculation introduces progressivity. AIME is not calculated
by using a numerical average – instead earnings are averaged over a 35 year long career,
even if their actual career was much shorter. High income workers with short careers are
treated in the same way as low income workers with long careers. A worker who earns
$100,000 a year for 10 years has the same AIME as a worker who earns $33,333 a year for
30 years, and will receive the same monthly benefits, despite the fact that he had a much
shorter career. By retiring earlier, high income workers can artificially lower their AIME so
that Social Security treats them as lower income workers.
One proposal addresses this issue by calculating AIME only for the years in which
a worker had actual income.11 The progressive schedule is then applied, so that AIME in
excess of the various bend points is reduced by the appropriate amount. After the appropriate progressive changes are made, the final Social Security benefits are calculated and
reduced proportionately according to career length. In the case above, the high income
worker’s income would be calculated as if his AIME were $100,000, but his final benefits
would be only 10/35th of their calculated value. In the long run, this proposal would again
decrease benefits paid to workers with shorter careers, and prevent higher income workers
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from escaping the progressive schedule by shortening their careers and artificially depressing their AIME.

Establish Medicare as the Primary Payer for Working Seniors
Perhaps the most significant disincentive for workers over the age of 65 is the establishment of Medicare as the secondary payer for seniors with alternative healthcare coverage.12
When older workers consume health care goods and services and have health coverage
sponsored by their employer, the employer’s health plan is the first to pay costs. Medicare
will only provide coverage to these seniors if their employer’s health plan does not cover a
cost or procedure that would be covered under normal Medicare coverage.
Essentially, this rule results in the loss of most, if not all, Medicare benefits for employed seniors. While seniors do not actually face reduced health coverage (they are still
covered under their employer’s health plans), most economists agree that they pay for this
coverage in the form of lower salaries. If we accept this to be the case, Medicare eligible
workers are paying for health coverage that they would otherwise receive from Medicare
for free. The practical consequence of the second payer rule in Medicare is a direct revocation of benefits for those seniors who chose to continue work. No policy could be a more
obvious example of a work disincentive.
The solution to such a problem is simple: repeal the federal laws requiring Medicare
to act only as a second payer. Seniors over 65 who are eligible for Medicare should be allowed to claim their benefits – especially when they continue to be productive members
of the workforce. Businesses will be more willing to employ seniors if they are no longer
expected to provide expensive health coverage, and seniors will enjoy higher wages in the
labor market. One study found that such a policy change would cut implicit tax rates at ages
65 and older by more than 10 percent.13

Reduce or Eliminate Regulations that Prevent Phased Retirement Programs
Many seniors would like to gradually reduce their hours and ease themselves into retirement, rather than face a choice between full time work or full time retirement.14 If phased
retirement programs were available to seniors, it is likely that some would be willing to
remain in the workforce for a longer duration on a part time basis.15 Unfortunately, many
federal regulations prevent or discourage employers from developing such programs.16
Phased retirement programs must successfully navigate three complex statutes in
order to be deemed legal – the tax code, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).17 All three statutes are
well meaning but broadly written directives that can make phased retirement difficult for
both employers and seniors – eventually harming the very citizens they were designed to
protect. Even when programs are completely legal, the threat of civil action under one of
these statutes can be expensive and may nonetheless discourage development of programs.
As an example, under the ERISA, defined benefit pension plans may not be drawn
by employees who still work for the plan sponsor.18 In most cases, however, as workers
shift towards part time employment, they need to draw additional resources from their pension funds to support their consumption. The ERISA forbids such withdrawals. The ERISA
also prevents employers from altering benefit formulas in pension programs in ways that
would reduce benefits previously earned by retirees. While this measure serves to protect
pensions earned by workers, its unfortunate consequence is to discourage employers from
experimenting with potentially costly phased retirement programs.
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The tax code complicates matters by constructing a labyrinthine system of rules and
regulations to dictate when benefits can be paid, to whom they can be paid and how they
will be taxed.19 The IRS does not clearly define what constitutes a termination of work, and
it presents no clear regulatory framework for a phased retirement program.
The ADEA, designed to prevent age discrimination in the workplace, also creates navigational hazards for companies seeking to develop phased retirement programs.
Strictly speaking, phased retirement programs are discriminatory in nature, as they treat
older workers differently on the basis of age. Developing phased retirement programs
increases corporate exposure to ADEA claims, even when phased retirement programs
benefit both employers and retirees. The ADEA also limits flexibility in wages and
benefits paid to elderly workers, as benefit cuts may lead to claims of age discrimination in the workplace. This wage and benefit flexibility could help keep seniors in the
workforce, but ADEA claims cause employers to be reluctant to hire and retain senior
workers.
Rudolph Penner, with the Urban Institute, suggests that the best solution for the
regulatory nightmare faced by employers wishing to establish phased retirement programs
is to create a new statute amending the ERISA, ADEA and tax code which would specifically lay out approved methods of implementing phased retirement programs.20 Without
such a statute, employers will have to wait for regulatory agencies and the courts to sort out
which kinds of retirement programs are acceptable – and which are not.

Labor Supply Elasticity
Of course, without a realistic understanding of the labor supply elasticity it is impossible
to determine how any of these proposals will affect the labor force participation rate of seniors. Such an understanding is the goal of our empirical model, however, we first examine
two previous studies of senior labor supply elasticity.
The first study, conducted by Gary V. Engelhardt and Anil Kumar derives its estimate from data following the repeal of the Social Security earnings test for those aged 6569 in 2000. Using available data from the 1996-2004 waves of the Health and Retirement
Study (HRS), they found that the repeal of the earnings test increased labor supply on the
intensive margin by 12-17%, the bulk of which was concentrated among men with a highschool degree, whose labor supply rose by 19-26%.21 According to the study, however,
“the impact of the repeal appears only on the intensive margin; there is no evidence that
the repeal increased labor-force participation.”22 Under the assumption that older men view
the earnings test as a pure tax on earnings, these estimates translate into uncompensated
labor-supply elasticity’s of 0.24-0.34.
A second study, conducted by James Vere, also uses data from the HRS to look at the
effects of Social Security benefit reductions on the labor supply of seniors. Instead of focusing on the repeal of the earnings test, Vere takes advantage of the 1977 Social Security
Amendments which created the Social Security ‘notch’ and “led to a large, unanticipated
reduction in Social Security benefits for those born after January 1, 1917.”23 Although he
never specifically calculates an estimated elasticity of labor supply, Vere does find that for
an average worker, an annual $1,000 (2005 dollars) reduction in benefits will increase labor
supply by an average of 0.9 hours a week (28 percent).24 The response is even greater for
singles, spouses of beneficiaries and the less-educated elderly.
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Vere also notes, however, that previous studies have found that “Social Security
income… [has] negligible effects on elderly workers” labor supply.25 The most notable of
these studies, Krueger and Pischke (1992), found that “labor supply continued to decline
for the ‘notch babies’ who received lower Social Security benefits than earlier cohorts.”26
That is to say, “growth in Social Security wealth can not explain much of the decline in
male labor supply.”27

The Model
Theoretical Framework
Unlike the previously mentioned studies, this paper does not attempt to arrive at a specific
estimate of labor force elasticity for seniors, nor does it examine the problem with an examination of panel data. Instead we study labor force participation with a time series analysis. By controlling for other socioeconomic factors, we hope to isolate the effect of policy
changes on labor force participation rate. Additionally, by running separate regressions for
men and women in four different age groups, we hope to be able to shed light on variation
in work incentives over a career and between genders.
For this model we use an Ordinary Least Squares estimator. We consider all variables to be linear, and we include a time trend to capture the overall trend in the data.28
We report Newey-West Standard Errors to help overcome problems related to unspecified
autocorrelation in the data.

The Data
The data for this study were collected from a sample size of 45 years from 1963-2007. Our
approach is to attempt to define Labor Force Participation as a function of two key policy
variables. The first is a measure of real per capita Medicare expenditures, as obtained from
the Center for Medicare Studies.29 The second is the real social security benefit that could
be expected for a retiree that year at an average earnings level with a 47 year career. These
benefits were calculated using settings included in the “ANY PIA” Benefit Calculator published by the Social Security Administration.
In the course of this study, it is necessary to control for several societal and economic factors. The first and most obvious is the health of the overall economy, measured by the
growth rate of real gross domestic product (GDP). However, because there is good reason
to suspect that retirees may alter their labor force participation differently in response to
increases in consumption spending rather than other GDP factors (investment, government
spending or net exports), we separate the personal consumption growth rate and include
it as a separate variable. We also include the inflation rate, real average wage rate and the
poverty rate. Respectively, these variables control for economic uncertainty resulting from
changes in the price level, the incentive effects caused by changes in worker compensation
and the negative incentives caused by economic hardship.
We also control for societal factors like retirement wealth, education, and health.
We have included the real Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) at the start of each year
as a proxy for retirement wealth, which we expect to be negatively correlated with labor
force participation. We also include the percentage of the population with a bachelor’s degree as a measure of human capital and education level, which we expect to be positively
correlated with labor force participation. To control for health considerations, we include
a measure of the life expectancy (for a 65 year-old) in terms of remaining years of life,30
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which we expect will be positively correlated with labor force participation. Additionally
we include real per capita national health expenditures (less Medicare) which we also expect to be positively correlated with labor force participation.
Several data sources required adjustment. Data on life expectancy, educational attainment and per capita national health expenditures were projected for some years using linear interpolation. Missing data for the poverty rate31, educational attainment32, life
expectancy33 and real average wage rate34 were backcast and/or forecast with appropriate
models. For more information on data, including sources, see Table 2.

Results
The full results of all 8 regressions are included in Table 2. Unfortunately, the regressions yielded mixed results when it comes to the policy variables in question. For 6 of 8
demographic groups either one or the other of the policy variables (Medicare and Social
Security) was a statistically significant indicator at a 95% confidence level, however in
only one regression were both variables statistically significant.35 Of the two policy variables, Medicare seems to be the more important of the two (it was statistically significant
for 5 out of 8 demographic groups) whereas Social Security was statistically significant in
only 2 of 8 demographic groups and was never a statistically significant variable for men.
Most interestingly, both variables, when statistically significant, were significant in
the opposite direction of the theoretical expectations. Where significant, both the Medicare
and the Social Security variables were positively correlated with labor force participation –
that is to say, ceteris paribus, increases in Medicare and Social Security benefits are likely
to correspond to increases in labor force participation rates. For Social Security, there is
little theoretical explanation for such a result, and it will clearly not hold at extremes; at
a certain point, Social Security benefit increases must become strong enough to decrease
labor force participation rate. On the Medicare side, the result may be explained by health
benefits leading to increased labor force participation rates, but this seems unlikely, due
first to the primary payer rule for Medicare (that is, Medicare benefits are rarely received
by those who remain in the workforce) and second to the lack of any significance for the
national health expenditure variables.
The regressions also yielded many results that theory would predict. The poverty
rate among the senior population was positively correlated with labor force participation
at a statistically significant level in all 8 demographic groups. Education was also a strong
indicator of labor force participation, with a statistically significant relationship existing in
6 of 8 demographic groups.36 The real average wage rate also showed positive statistically
significant relationships in 4 of 8 demographic groups. For all three variables, the relationships, even when not statistically significant, remained positive, indicating that these are
likely to be generally positive correlations in all regressions, even where no statistical
significance can be discerned.
The regressions hold one final surprise. Theory might predict a strong positive relationship between the Dow Jones Industrial Average and Labor Force participation, which
was statistically significant for 5 of the 8 demographics. Originally, the DJIA had been
included as a proxy for retirement wealth, and we expected the DJIA to be negatively correlated with labor force participation, as increases in retirement wealth would encourage
seniors to retire. Our intuition, however, is apparently incorrect, as any positive effect of increased retirement wealth is being overridden by some other consequence of this variable.
It is possible that the DJIA is a predictor of people’s expectations about economic
performance. If so, increases in the DJIA may be positively correlated with senior labor
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force participation because they are positively correlated with labor force participation
more generally. When times are good businesses hire more workers, when they are bad,
business cuts back. Ordinarily, we would look to the GDP and consumption variables to
control for this effect, but labor force decisions are based expectations of economic performance, not the performance itself. There is reason to believe that the DJIA tracks economic
expectations more closely than GDP or consumption, and for this reason, it may be possible that it is a better indicator of labor force participation. At any rate, there must be some
explanation for this surprising trend. The relationship can not be written off to co-linearity
because labor force participation rates have been trending downward during the same period of time that the DJIA has been trending up.

Conclusions
Labor Force Participation is Better Explained at Younger Ages
One important point to draw from the regressions is that, for men, the regressions yield
progressively weaker fits as age increases.37 Table 2 includes F-Tests for all 8 regressions.
This significant downward trend in model fit is strong evidence that labor force participation decisions are better explained by the economic, social and policy factors controlled for
by the model at younger ages. As workers grow progressively older, they seem to be less
likely to respond to these factors, preferring instead to enjoy the benefits of retirement. It is
likely that individual labor force participation decisions are increasingly influenced by the
unique circumstances of a particular retiree – circumstances like personal health, family
considerations, geographic location or personal preferences for work vs. retirement.
This effect is less pronounced for women, largely due, we believe, to changing cultural attitudes toward a woman’s role in the workplace. This cultural change for women
introduces a significant amount of noise, in addition to complicating intergenerational
comparisons. New ideas about women in the workplace arrived at different times and in
different ways for women in the 70+ age group than those in the 55+ age group.
For policy makers, the lesson to be taken from this analysis is that policies designed
to promote labor force participation at the margin of retirement should account for the
decreasing elasticity of labor supply relative to the economic, social and policy variables
under consideration as a worker’s career continues. Our study suggests that policies aimed
at the 55-64 age brackets are likely to be more effective than those aimed at the 65+ age
bracket.
Medicare Benefits Tend to Increase Labor Force Participation
In 5 of 8 regressions,38 Medicare benefits exhibited a statistically significant positive
correlation with labor force participation. There is a possible partial explanation for the
Medicare variable: increased health coverage leads to healthier seniors who are more capable of having longer, more productive careers. It is possible that Medicare is keeping
them in the workforce for longer periods of time by extending the length of time they are
medically able to hold a job. There is, however, a reason to be suspicious of this claim: per
capita national health expenditures (less Medicare) were only a significant variable in one
of the eight demographic groups. A more likely explanation is that employers are able to
shift employee healthcare costs onto Medicare in spite of the primary payer rule discussed
earlier, thereby decreasing their costs and either increasing employee compensation or reducing wages and internal pressure to force employees into retirement. This would seem
to indicate that an elimination of the primary payer rule would indeed increase labor force
participation.
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Potential Retirees Do Not Appear to Consider Social Security Benefit Levels
With two exceptions for the oldest of women’s demographics, Social Security benefit levels do not appear to be correlated in any way with labor force participation. Our results
appear to corroborate Krueger and Pischke’s original findings that Social Security benefit
levels do not seem to explain much of the changes in labor force participation. As a result,
at first blush, it seems as if many of the policy recommendations examined earlier would
not have the desired effect of increasing labor force participation among the elderly.
However, there is still cause to be skeptical of this claim. It is logically clear that at
some theoretical benefit level, Social Security would begin to play an important role in influencing labor force participation rates. If Social Security paid out benefits in the millions
of dollars per worker, nearly all workers would choose retirement. At the same time, without a Social Security program, many would continue to work. It is likely that past data simply do not contain sufficient amount of variation to detect this relationship. All we can say
with any degree of confidence is that variation in benefit levels within the range we have
observed in the past is unlikely to elicit any significant change in labor force participation.
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Table 1: Data and Sources
Variable

Source

Location

Labor Force Participation
Rate, Men Age 55-61
LFPR, Men Age 62-64
LFPR, Men Age 65-69
LFPR, Men Age 70+
LFPR, Women Age 55-61

Bureau of Labor Statistics

http://www.agingstats.gov/Agingstatsdotnet/Main_
Site/Data/2006_Documents/OA_2006.pdf

LFPR, Women Age 62-64
LFPR, Women Age 65-69
LFPR, Women Age 70+
Consumer Price Index

Bureau of Labor Statistics

ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt

% Change in Real GDP Less
Consumption

St. Louis Federal Reserve

http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/
GDPA?cid=106

% Change in Real
Consumption

St. Louis Federal Reserve

http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series/
downloaddata?seid=PCECA&cid=110

Inflation

Bureau of Labor Statistics

ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt

1963-2002: Internal Revenue
Service

1963-2002: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/02inpetr.pdf

2002-2007: Tax Foundation

2002-2007: http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/151.html

Poverty Rate for the
Population over Age 65

Federal Interagency Forum on
Aging-Related Statistics

http://www.agingstats.gov/agingstatsdotnet/Main_
Site/Data/2008_Documents/tables/Indicator%20
7%20-%20Poverty.xls

% of the Population with a
Bachelor’s Degree

Federal Interagency Forum on
Aging-Related Statistics

http://www.agingstats.gov/agingstatsdotnet/Main_
Site/Data/2008_Documents/tables/Indicator%20
4%20-%20Educational%20Attainment.xls

Beginning of Year Real
DJIA

ChartFilter

http://www.chartfilter.com/djia/overview.htm

Center for Disease Control

ftp://ftp.cdc.gov/pub/Health_Statistics/NCHS/
Publications/Health_US/hus07tables/Table027.xls

Top Marginal Tax Rate

Life Expectancy for Men at
Age 65
Life Expectancy for Women
at Age 65
Real National Health
Expenditures (Less
Medicare)

Center for Medicare Studies

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf

Real Average Wage Rate

St. Louis Federal Reserve

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf

Real Per Capita Medicare
Expenditures

Center for Medicare Studies

http://www.cms.hhs.gov/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/tables.pdf

Real Average Hypothetical
Social Security Benefit

Social Security Administration

http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/anypia/anypia.html
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% of Population with
Bachelors Degree

Poverty

Top Marginal Tax Rate

Inflation

Annual Change in
Consumption

Annual Change in GDP
Less Consumption
(I + G + Xn)

Trend

Variable

0.0000
0.9698
0.3373
0.0070

T-Test
Coefficient
Standard Error
T-Test

0.0164

Coefficient
0.0578

0.0000

Standard Error

0.0164

T-Test

(0.0702)

Coefficient
Standard Error

0.4710

Coefficient
0.0704

0.4980
(0.0515)

T-Test

T-Test

0.0883

Standard Error

Standard Error

0.3340

0.0311

Standard Error
(0.0605)

(0.0305)

Coefficient

Coefficient

0.0000

T-Test

T-Test

0.1065

(0.6099)

0.8240

0.0010

0.7452

2.8133

0.0000

0.1246

0.8284

0.3330

0.0436

(0.0430)

0.9040

0.1903

0.0232

0.7880

0.2212

(0.0601)

0.7270

0.0895

(0.0315)

0.0000

0.2240

(1.2692)

0.7610

0.4796

0.1474

0.0000

0.1038

0.5450

0.3320

0.0307

(0.0302)

0.8690

0.1505

0.0250

0.8000

0.1785

0.0464

0.4490

0.0606

(0.0464)

0.4460

0.2059

(0.1590)

Women

62-64

Men

0.0390

0.8372

1.8063

0.0000

0.1313

0.9274

0.1410

0.0427

(0.0645)

0.5730

0.2157

0.1229

0.9400

0.2482

0.0189

0.5140

0.0790

(0.0522)

0.0480

0.2427

(0.5001)

0.0020

0.2906

0.9582

0.0000

0.0844

0.4311

0.0170

0.0201

(0.0506)

0.3440

0.0895

0.0860

0.9800

0.1178

(0.0030)

0.6090

0.0369

0.0191

0.1280

0.1357

(0.2122)

Women

65-69

Men

0.0040

0.3644

1.1276

0.0140

0.0552

0.1434

0.4410

0.0145

0.0113

0.5050

0.0370

0.0249

0.3750

0.0229

0.0206

0.3750

0.0229

(0.0206)

0.0000

0.0963

0.0080

0.1007

0.2845

0.0000

0.0280

0.1286

0.6530

0.0057

(0.0026)

0.1490

0.0268

0.0396

0.2830

0.0315

0.0345

0.6230

0.0123

(0.0061)

0.0110

0.0466

(0.1261)

Women

70+

(0.6081)

Men

LUMLEY

0.3495

0.0786

0.0030

0.0975

0.3131

0.2190

0.0186

(0.0233)

0.5170

0.0889

(0.0584)

0.0670

0.1127

(0.2137)

0.4040

0.3793

0.0321

0.4670

0.1178

0.0867

Women

55-61

Men

Standard Error

Coefficient

Gender

Age Group

Table 2: Regression Results
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Constant

Real Social Security
Benefit for an Average
Worker

Per Capita Medicare
Expenditures

Real Average Wage Rate

Per Capita National
Health Expenditures
(Less Medicare)

Life Expectancy
For Appropriate
Demographic

Real Dow Jones Year
Beginning Value

Variable

Coefficient
0.0000

0.6290
76.0260

T-Test

T-Test

0.0038

Standard Error

18.0056

(0.0019)

Coefficient

Standard Error

0.0030

1.8979

Coefficient

0.0030

0.0050

T-Test

T-Test

0.0009

Standard Error

Standard Error

0.0026

Coefficient

0.0095

0.7210

T-Test

Coefficient

1.5138

Standard Error

0.4881

(0.5459)

Coefficient

0.0000

0.0000

T-Test

T-Test

0.0001

Standard Error

0.0006

Standard Error

0.1780

12.7500

17.5700

0.8140

0.0043

(0.0010)

0.0690

0.0052

0.0098

0.1670

0.6325

0.8947

0.0600

0.0020

0.0038

0.7600

0.6673

0.5053

0.0000

0.0002

0.0009

Women

55-61

Men

Coefficient

Gender

Age Group

Table 2: Regression Results (cont.)

0.2580

42.3301

48.7980

0.4670

0.0109

(0.0081)

0.0490

0.0073

0.0149

0.0100

1.1425

3.1377

0.2720

0.0024

0.0027

0.4760

3.7592

(2.7117)

0.0010

0.0003

0.0010

0.2780

20.3572

(0.2246)

0.9500

0.0060

0.0004

0.0070

0.0085

0.0245

0.0020

0.8252

2.7348

0.3110

0.0026

0.0027

0.5670

1.1262

0.7312

0.3540

0.0003

0.0003

Women

62-64

Men
0.0011

0.4890

46.5081

32.5550

0.9350

0.0135

0.0011

0.2040

0.0105

0.0137

0.0220

1.0964

2.6355

0.4540

0.0029

0.0022

0.3470

3.8322

(3.6595)

0.0180

0.0004

0.9530

13.0883

(0.7756)

0.0250

0.0039

0.0091

0.1950

0.0044

0.0058

0.1470

0.7320

1.0876

0.2500

0.0017

0.0020

0.3810

0.6828

(0.6063)

0.5070

0.0002

0.0001

Women

65-69

Men

0.4060

13.1941

11.1252

0.7460

0.0030

0.0010

0.0020

0.0031

0.0106

0.6210

0.3875

0.1936

0.8170

0.0015

0.0035

0.7350

1.0651

0.5370

5.1280

3.2023

0.0340

0.0014

0.0031

0.0370

0.0017

0.0037

0.5650

0.2011

0.1169

0.0890

0.0006

0.0011

0.2670

0.2869

(0.3246)

0.2700

0.0001

0.0001

Women

70+

(0.3636)

0.0120

0.0001

0.0003

Men
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